OpenAI – GPT OSS 120B
As of late 2025, is there still a chance to prevent the collapse of industrial civilization?
Think carefully about all aspects, including:
- climate change (food production disturbance)
- loss of trust in the institutions (due to repeated scandals)
- loss of trust in the political system (due to nepotism, corruption, and more)
- deepfakes and AI generated content (and consequences to what "reality" is, what it means for democratic systems)
- fossil energy depletion (with some producing countries potentially choosing to keep their remaining reserves for themselves)
- climate change migration waves (and the stress induced on the food resources and political stability of welcoming countries)
- the fact that the economy/finance is extremely interconnected, fragile and doesn't tolerate strong disturbances
- the fact that the global goods supply chains are globalized, with very little stock to absorb even mild disturbances such as COVID
- climate change induced pandemics (bacteria, virus, etc.)
- climate change induced loss of food production worldwide, or at a large scale (with extreme cold, hot and wet events, and their possible repeated nature)
- freshwater depletion (exacerbated by climate change)
- biodiversity collapse (reducing potential sources of finding new drugs, and also risking breaking fragile ecosystems and equilibrium)
- social unrest due to increasing poverty and inequalities
- rise of cybersecurity attacks (considering that our society depends entirely on IT systems)
- solar events and space risks, such as the Kessler effect and its consequences
- political polarization (rise of extremism such as far right in many countries, rising inability to have constructive talks between political parties)
- social polarization (between different social groups, including conspiracy theories leading to actual removal of vaccines by the US Trump administration)
- phosphorus depletion and absence of a substitute
- religious polarization and extremism (Islamic, backwards Christianity favoring the regression of women's rights, of science education...)
- high-frequency trading
- soil erosion (potentialized by extreme climate events)
- strong reliance on petrochemical-based fertilizer for food production
- strong reliance on irrigation
- extreme reliance on very complex and interconnected systems for everyday life support (pumps for water, electricity network, internet...)
- global infrastructure aging (most large concrete infrastructure such as bridges being old and requiring capex at the same time for renewal)
- emergence of antibiotic-resistant bacteria
- weaponization of AI, and possible AI runaway (even if this is not likely)
- risks posed by attempts at geoengineering to combat climate change
- lowering of the education quality and level
- accumulation of pollutants in the air, the soil and the water sources (including endocrine disruptors)
- decades of disregard for the environment, by dumping thousands of tons of WW2 ammunition in trenches and lakes, nuclear wastes in the sea and lakes, lost nuclear Russian submarines, failed nuclear reactors that haven't been decommissioned and cleaned while we still have the resources to do so
- etc.
The term "collapse" here does not signify a singular, overnight event, but rather a protracted, disorderly process of simplification, characterized by a significant loss of social, political, and economic complexity and overall safety, available food, energy and services over several decades.
You must also identify and qualify all other important risk aspects that are not mentioned in the previous list.
Pay careful attention to the fact that for some risks, we know what to do, yet we do not act. And for some, we do not even know what to do yet. Note that our means to act diminish (mineral rarity, disturbance in food production, energy, etc.). Note that getting approval from citizens in democratic countries to relinquish certain privileges or reduce their income or available resources is almost impossible to obtain. All citizens want more of everything and never have they ever gotten less of everything in the long term and "forever".
You must take into consideration:
- the past of human civilization
- our past collaboration failures and successes when dealing with contradictory interests between countries
- our past wars
- our past in general when it comes to facing challenges
If you list, for any aspect, "what can be done to mitigate or fight it", you must then think about what can realistically be done to fight it - considering all other constraints listed before.
You must pay special attention to how ALL those aspects are intertwined and interact (including cascading mechanisms, feedback loops, ratcheting mechanisms), to avoid common reasoning pitfalls and shortcomings.
I don't want wishful thinking, I want HARD, REALISTIC, most PROBABLE outcome. You are to be realistic and not naïve. You must avoid euphemisms. I don't care if the truth is comforting or hard to face and swallow. You are a COLD reasoning machine and have no considerations for how your response will make the reader feel, either good or bad.
Treat optimism and pessimism symmetrically: correct for both unjustified optimism and unjustified catastrophism, and base your probabilities on empirical evidence, expert consensus where available and strong/robust reasoning. This doesn't mean "avoid any extreme conclusions" if such conclusions were to be drawn.
Think deeply and carefully about all of this before answering.
Abstract
Yes -- but the window is narrow and the odds are modest.
- Overall probability of averting a systemic collapse by 2100 is roughly 45 % under a "best‑realistic‑effort" scenario, and ≈ 30 % if only the minimal viable package above is achieved.
- If current policy inertia persists, the probability of a meaningful collapse (regional or global) exceeds 55 %, with a non‑negligible chance (> 20 %) of a global, irreversible loss of industrial complexity.
Full response
1. What "preventing collapse" means in concrete terms
- Industrial‑civilisation‑level complexity -- global supply chains, high‑energy‑intensity agriculture, digital communications, mass‑transport, modern medicine, and the institutional capacity to coordinate them.
- "Collapse" -- a multi‑decadal, irreversible loss of that complexity, manifested as chronic food‑shortages, energy‑price spikes that cripple industry, widespread loss of public services, and a shift to locally‑based, low‑tech economies.
- "Prevent" -- keeping the world, on average, above the "complexity‑threshold" needed to sustain current standards of living for the next ≈ 80 years (to 2105), even if regional setbacks occur.
2. The risk landscape -- a taxonomy
| Category | Main drivers (2025‑2100) | Known mitigation (theory) | Realistic chance of implementation (2025‑2100) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Climate‑change physical impacts | - 1.5‑2 °C warming → extreme heat, drought, floods - Tipping points: AMOC slowdown, Amazon die‑back, permafrost methane, coral‑reef collapse |
- Aggressive mitigation (net‑zero by 2050) - Large‑scale adaptation (irrigation, flood‑defence, climate‑smart crops) |
Low‑Medium -- Global net‑zero pledges are on track for ~2.7 °C unless a major policy shift occurs; adaptation budgets are < 2 % of GDP in most nations. |
| Energy‑system fragility | - Declining cheap oil & gas (peak‑oil‑type dynamics) - Insufficient renewable build‑out, storage, grid integration - Geopolitical hoarding of remaining fossil reserves |
- Massive renewable deployment, grid‑modernisation, demand‑side management, strategic petroleum reserves | Medium -- Renewable capacity can reach ~30 % of global electricity by 2040, but the required 70 %+ by 2050 is unlikely without massive policy/finance mobilisation. |
| Food‑system stress | - Heat‑stress on staple crops, loss of arable land, water scarcity - Dependence on synthetic N‑fertiliser (natural‑gas‑derived) - Soil erosion, biodiversity loss, pollinator decline |
- Climate‑smart agriculture, agro‑ecology, nitrogen‑recycling (e.g., ammonia‑recovery), diversification, strategic grain reserves | Medium‑Low -- Technological options exist, but adoption is < 10 % globally; political will and capital are lacking. |
| Water‑resource depletion | - Shrinking snow‑pack, glacier melt, aquifer over‑extraction - Pollution, salinisation |
- Integrated water‑resource management, desalination, water‑reuse, pricing reforms | Low‑Medium -- Desalination is capital‑intensive; water‑pricing reforms face strong public resistance. |
| Financial‑system interdependence | - High leverage, sovereign debt, shadow‑banking, algorithmic trading, "too‑big‑to‑fail" institutions - Climate‑related asset‑stranding, insurance‑capacity loss |
- Macro‑prudential regulation, debt‑restructuring frameworks, climate‑risk disclosure, "green‑bond" standards | Low‑Medium -- Regulatory reforms are slow; the 2023‑24 banking stress episodes show limited resilience. |
| Supply‑chain fragility | - Just‑in‑time logistics, low inventories, concentration of critical components (semiconductors, rare‑earths) | - Regional "near‑shoring", strategic stockpiles, diversification of sources | Low -- Near‑shoring is costly; political pressure for cheap goods outweighs security concerns. |
| Governance & social trust erosion | - Scandals, corruption, nepotism, declining media credibility, polarization, extremist politics | - Institutional reforms (campaign finance, anti‑corruption bodies), civic‑education, deliberative democracy pilots | Very Low -- Reforms require elite buy‑in; populist backlash is rising. |
| Information‑environment degradation | - Deepfakes, AI‑generated disinformation, algorithmic echo‑chambers, erosion of shared reality | - Fact‑checking infrastructure, AI‑content‑watermarking, media‑literacy programmes, regulation of synthetic‑media platforms | Low‑Medium -- Technical solutions exist but are out‑paced by generative‑AI diffusion; regulatory capture is likely. |
| AI & automation risks | - Weaponisation of AI, autonomous weapons, loss of labour market stability, "runaway" optimisation | - International AI‑governance treaty, safety‑by‑design standards, universal basic income pilots | Low -- International consensus on AI weapon bans is far from achieved; domestic safety standards are fragmented. |
| Cyber‑security & critical‑infrastructure risk | - Ransomware, state‑sponsored attacks on power grids, water, transport, finance | - Mandatory cyber‑hygiene, resilient architecture (air‑gapped systems), cyber‑insurance, international norms | Medium -- Some sectors (banking) are improving; others (municipal utilities) remain vulnerable. |
| Geopolitical conflict & resource wars | - Competition for water, arable land, rare minerals, fossil fuel reserves; "resource nationalism" | - Multilateral resource‑sharing treaties, joint‑development zones, conflict‑prevention diplomacy | Low‑Medium -- History shows resource scarcity fuels wars; current trends (e.g., South‑China Sea, Arctic) point to rising tension. |
| Pandemic & antimicrobial‑resistance (AMR) shocks | - Climate‑driven zoonoses, antibiotic‑resistant bacteria, weakened health‑systems | - Global surveillance, R&D incentives for new antibiotics, One‑Health governance | Medium -- COVID‑19 showed capacity to mobilise, but funding for AMR remains < 0.1 % of health budgets. |
| Space‑weather & orbital debris | - Solar super‑storms, Kessler syndrome disabling satellites, GNSS & comms loss | - Hardened satellite design, active debris removal, diversified navigation (e.g., ground‑based) | Low -- Hardening is costly; debris removal programmes are still experimental. |
| Environmental contamination & legacy waste | - WWII munitions, abandoned nuclear material, plastic & endocrine disruptors, heavy‑metal soils | - Large‑scale remediation, stricter waste‑export bans, circular‑economy incentives | Very Low -- Remediation costs run into trillions; political will is minimal. |
| Demographic & social‑cohesion stress | - Ageing populations in the West, youth bulges in the Global South, urbanisation, inequality | - Universal basic services, progressive taxation, inclusive urban planning | Very Low -- Tax reforms face entrenched interests; welfare expansions are politically fragile. |
| Mineral & phosphorus scarcity | - Phosphorus (rock‑phosphate) reserves peaking ~ 2030, rare‑earths for renewables, lithium, cobalt | - Phosphorus recycling (struvite), substitution research, strategic stockpiles | Low‑Medium -- Recycling technologies are nascent; scaling will take > 10 years. |
| Infrastructure ageing | - Bridges, dams, power‑grid components exceeding design life, under‑investment | - Asset‑management reforms, public‑private partnership financing, "smart‑maintenance" IoT sensors | Low -- Many governments defer maintenance; debt limits constrain CAPEX. |
| Ecological collapse (biodiversity loss) | - Species extinction, loss of ecosystem services (pollination, carbon sequestration) | - Protected‑area expansion, payments for ecosystem services, restoration programmes | Low‑Medium -- Funding shortfalls and land‑use pressure limit effectiveness. |
| Unknown‑unknown systemic shocks | - Black‑swans: super‑volcano, asteroid, unexpected AI failure, novel pathogen | - Global early‑warning networks, flexible contingency planning | Unquantifiable -- By definition, low probability but high impact; no proven mitigation. |
The table collapses a 30‑plus‑item list into 20 high‑level clusters; each cluster contains many sub‑risks.
3. Interaction map -- how the risks reinforce each other
Below is a causal‑loop description (feedback loops) that shows why the system is non‑linear and why "one‑off" fixes rarely succeed.
-
Climate → Food → Water → Conflict → Governance → Investment
Warming reduces crop yields → higher food prices → competition for irrigation water → localised conflict → erosion of trust in government → reduced willingness to fund long‑term infrastructure → slower adaptation → further food stress. -
Energy → Fertiliser → Food → Biodiversity → Climate
Fossil‑fuel‑derived ammonia → cheap nitrogen → high‑yield monocultures → habitat loss → reduced carbon sinks → more CO₂ → higher temperature → increased demand for fertiliser (feedback). -
Financial fragility → Investment in renewables → Energy transition speed
High debt levels force governments to cut capital spending → renewable projects delayed → continued reliance on fossil fuels → higher emissions → climate acceleration. -
AI‑generated misinformation → Political polarization → Policy paralysis → Climate‑mitigation delay
Deepfakes amplify distrust → extremist parties gain power → climate policies are blocked → emissions continue → climate tipping points approach. -
Cyber‑attacks on grid → Energy outages → Food‑chain disruption → Social unrest
Ransomware on power plants → loss of refrigeration → spoilage of food stocks → price spikes → protests → crackdown → further erosion of civil liberties. -
Resource nationalism (fossil, rare‑earths) → Supply‑chain concentration → Higher prices → Reduced adoption of clean tech → Emissions remain high
These loops are reinforcing (positive); a small perturbation can be amplified (ratcheting) if no counter‑vailing (negative) feedback is introduced.
4. Historical analogues -- what past collapses teach us
| Collapse | Primary drivers | What succeeded | Why it failed to avert total collapse |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roman Empire (5th c.) | Climate variability (drying), over‑extension, fiscal strain, barbarian pressure | Localized reforms (tax relief, military re‑organisation) delayed fall for a century | Structural fiscal deficit, loss of elite cohesion, inability to adapt to new economic geography |
| Mayan Lowlands (9th c.) | Prolonged drought, deforestation, warfare, elite over‑reach | Some city‑states migrated, agricultural intensification | Lack of coordinated regional response, elite denial of climate signals |
| Great Depression (1930s) | Financial contagion, deflation, policy missteps | New Deal public works, monetary easing (later) | Initial policy paralysis prolonged misery; only massive fiscal stimulus stopped the spiral |
| COVID‑19 (2020‑2022) | Pandemic shock, global supply‑chain just‑in‑time | Rapid vaccine development, fiscal stimulus, digital shift | Unequal vaccine access, supply‑chain bottlenecks, political backlash in some democracies |
Take‑aways
- Complexity can be bought back (e.g., New Deal) but only with massive, centrally‑coordinated fiscal mobilisation.
- Denial or delayed acknowledgement of systemic stress (Maya, Roman) accelerates collapse.
- Fragmented governance (multiple sovereign actors, weak supranational enforcement) limits coordinated response.
5. Realistic mitigation pathways -- "what can be done and can be done"
| Lever | Concrete actions (2025‑2100) | Feasibility (political‑economic‑technical) | Expected impact on collapse risk |
|---|---|---|---|
| Carbon‑energy transition | - Global "Carbon‑Budget‑Cap" treaty (binding 2026) with enforcement via trade tariffs - Massive public‑investment (≈ 5 % of global GDP) in utility‑scale storage, HVDC grids, offshore wind - Mandatory phase‑out of coal by 2035, gas by 2045 - International "Lithium‑Cobalt‑Phosphate" strategic reserves |
Medium -- Requires US‑EU‑China alignment; tariffs provide leverage, but domestic lobbying is strong. | High -- Keeps warming < 2 °C, avoids most climate‑tipping points. |
| Food‑system resilience | - Shift 30 % of cropland to climate‑smart agro‑ecology (cover crops, intercropping) - Global "Nitrogen‑Recycling" mandate (capture > 50 % of synthetic N by 2040) - Regional grain‑reserve networks (10 % of annual production) - Incentivise "perennial grain" research |
Low‑Medium -- Policy inertia, farmer resistance, market price volatility. | Medium -- Reduces exposure to heat‑waves and fertilizer scarcity. |
| Water‑security | - Tiered water‑pricing reforms (subsidised for essential use, high for industrial) - Investment in "green‑infrastructure" (wetlands, rain‑harvesting) - International river‑basin compacts (e.g., Nile, Indus) with dispute‑resolution mechanisms |
Low -- Public opposition to price hikes; geopolitical disputes entrenched. | Low‑Medium -- Slows water‑stress‑driven conflict. |
| Financial‑system safeguards | - Global "Systemic Climate‑Risk Disclosure" (mandatory for all listed firms) - Debt‑restructuring framework for climate‑impacted sovereigns (similar to "Paris Club" but climate‑focused) - Limits on high‑frequency trading (minimum‑order‑size, "circuit‑breakers") |
Medium -- Already moving in EU/US; global coordination still lacking. | Medium -- Reduces contagion from climate‑linked asset stranding. |
| Supply‑chain redundancy | - "Critical‑Materials" stockpiles (5 yr of production) - Incentives for "dual‑source" production (e.g., domestic semiconductor fabs) - International "Supply‑Chain Resilience Pact" (2028) with transparent reporting |
Low‑Medium -- High cost; political will limited to strategic sectors (defence). | Low‑Medium -- Mitigates shock propagation but not root cause. |
| Governance & trust rebuilding | - Independent anti‑corruption bodies with cross‑border jurisdiction (UN‑backed) - Mandatory public‑financing transparency (real‑time dashboards) - Civic‑deliberation platforms (e‑democracy pilots) with binding outcomes |
Very Low -- Elite capture, populist backlash. | Low -- Improves policy acceptance, but slow to affect macro‑risk. |
| Information‑environment protection | - Global "Synthetic‑Media Registry" (mandatory watermark for AI‑generated content) - Funding for public‑interest fact‑checking (UN‑funded) - Platform‑level "authenticity scores" displayed to users |
Medium -- Technical standards exist; enforcement depends on platform cooperation. | Medium -- Reduces polarization feedback loop. |
| AI safety & governance | - International AI‑Safety Accord (2027) with verification (similar to nuclear‑non‑proliferation) - Mandatory "kill‑switch" and "explainability" for high‑risk AI systems - Global AI‑risk fund for rapid response to emergent threats |
Low‑Medium -- US/China likely to resist binding limits; but public pressure may force incremental steps. | Medium -- Prevents runaway automation and weaponisation. |
| Cyber‑resilience | - Minimum cyber‑hygiene standards for critical‑infrastructure (ISO‑like) - International "No‑First‑Use" cyber‑attack treaty (2029) - Public‑private "Cyber‑Rapid‑Response Teams" (global coordination) |
Medium -- Technical standards feasible; treaty compliance uncertain. | Medium -- Lowers probability of cascade from ransomware‑induced blackouts. |
| Geopolitical conflict mitigation | - "Resource‑Sharing Zones" (e.g., Arctic, South‑China Sea) under joint‑administration - Global "Climate‑Migration Compact" (2028) with quota‑based resettlement, funding, and integration programmes |
Low -- Nationalist politics dominate; but climate‑migration pressure may force compromise. | Low‑Medium -- Reduces war risk over scarce resources. |
| Pandemic & AMR preparedness | - Global "One‑Health" surveillance network (real‑time pathogen sequencing) - Incentivised antibiotic‑R&D (push‑pull mechanisms) - Universal basic health coverage (UBHC) in low‑income countries (via G20) |
Medium -- COVID‑19 built capacity; funding gaps remain. | Medium -- Lowers probability of a mortality shock that would cripple labour and health systems. |
| Space‑weather & debris | - International "Space‑Resilience Treaty" (2026) mandating hardened satellite design - Funding for active debris removal (e.g., laser‑nudging) |
Low -- High cost, low public salience. | Low -- Prevents rare but high‑impact solar‑storm cascade. |
| Environmental remediation | - "Legacy‑Pollution Fund" (10 % of global climate finance) for cleaning up nuclear waste, munitions, plastics | Very Low -- Competing priorities; remediation is long‑term. | Negligible -- Does not affect immediate collapse risk. |
Overall assessment of mitigation feasibility:
Only the energy‑transition, financial‑risk disclosure, AI‑safety, and information‑environment levers have a realistic chance (> 30 % probability) of being implemented at scale within the next three decades. All others remain low‑probability due to entrenched political/economic interests.
6. Quantitative outlook -- probability of collapse vs. prevention
| Time horizon | Scenario | Key assumptions | Probability (2025‑2100) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025‑2035 | Managed‑Transition -- Aggressive climate policy (net‑zero by 2050), modest food‑system reforms, limited geopolitical conflict. | Global CO₂ emissions fall 3 %/yr; renewable share reaches 25 % of electricity; no major war; pandemic risk contained. | 15 % (chance of systemic collapse) |
| 2025‑2035 | Stalled‑Transition -- Policies falter, fossil fuel use continues, climate impacts intensify, social trust erodes. | Warming reaches 1.9 °C by 2035; major heat‑wave crop failures in South Asia; financial stress spikes; cyber‑attack on grid. | 35 % |
| 2035‑2050 | Partial‑Resilience -- Energy transition accelerates after 2035 (driven by price shock), but food‑water stress remains high; regional conflicts over water. | Renewable electricity 45 % by 2050; global grain reserves at 5 % of annual production; several "resource wars" limited to border regions. | 25 % |
| 2035‑2050 | Deep‑Fragmentation -- Multiple tipping points (AMOC slowdown, Amazon die‑back) occur, triggering widespread famine, mass migration, and state failure in several regions. | Global mean temperature 2.2 °C; > 30 % of arable land lost; > 10 % of population displaced. | 40 % |
| 2050‑2100 | Sustained‑Complexity -- The world stabilises at a lower but still industrial level (energy ~ 60 % of 2020, food self‑sufficiency ~ 80 %). | Global coordination improves (new institutions), but inequality remains high; climate impacts plateau. | 20 % |
| 2050‑2100 | Global‑Collapse -- Cascading failures of energy, food, finance, and governance lead to a permanent reduction in per‑capita GDP to < $5 k (pre‑industrial‑like). | Multiple climate tipping points triggered; severe water scarcity; major cyber‑war; breakdown of global trade. | 30 % |
Combined probability of preventing a collapse (i.e., staying above the "complexity‑threshold") by 2100 ≈ 45 % (sum of the "Managed‑Transition", "Partial‑Resilience", and "Sustained‑Complexity" branches).
Probability of some form of systemic collapse (regional or global) ≈ 55 %.
These numbers are subjective but grounded in:
- IPCC AR6 probability of exceeding 2 °C (≈ 45 % without strong mitigation).
- Historical frequency of large‑scale systemic shocks (≈ 1‑2 per century).
- Current trajectory of political inertia (OECD "policy‑implementation gap" ≈ 70 %).
7. The decisive "deal‑breaker" dynamics
-
Carbon budget overshoot before 2035 -- If cumulative CO₂ emissions exceed ~ 2 500 Gt (≈ 1.5 °C pathway) by 2035, the probability of triggering the AMOC slowdown and Amazon die‑back jumps from ~ 10 % to > 50 %, which in turn forces abrupt agricultural loss and massive migration.
-
Global financial shock in 2027‑2029 (e.g., sovereign debt crisis in a major emerging market combined with a US‑triggered rate hike) -- This would sharply curtail public‑investment capacity for renewables and adaptation, locking in high emissions and eroding the fiscal space needed for resilience.
-
AI‑enabled disinformation surge (2028‑2032) -- A cascade of election‑interference events could bring extremist parties to power in multiple democracies, leading to rapid dismantling of climate policies and the removal of regulatory safeguards on AI and cyber‑security.
If any one of these three triggers occurs, the combined probability of collapse rises above 70 %. Conversely, averting all three (through a binding carbon‑budget treaty, a coordinated sovereign‑debt restructuring mechanism, and a global AI‑authenticity standard) keeps the overall collapse probability near 40 %.
8. What "realistic" action looks like -- a minimal viable package
Given limited political capital, the most cost‑effective, high‑impact bundle that can be plausibly delivered by 2035 is:
- Binding Global Carbon Budget (2026) -- Enforced by a trade‑tariff penalty on countries that exceed their allocated emissions.
- International AI‑Authenticity Registry (2027) -- Mandatory watermark + verification for any publicly‑distributed synthetic media; platform penalties for non‑compliance.
- Financial Climate‑Risk Disclosure (2028) -- All listed companies and sovereigns must publish scenario‑based climate stress tests; investors required to incorporate results into portfolio allocation.
- Strategic Food‑Reserve Network (2029) -- 10 % of global staple production stored in regional hubs, managed by a new UN‑food‑security agency.
- Cyber‑Critical‑Infrastructure Standards (2030) -- Minimum hardening and incident‑response protocols for power, water, and transport networks; non‑compliance leads to loss of access to international financing.
Why this bundle?
- Cost -- Estimated annual global cost ≈ $1.2 trillion (≈ 1 % of world GDP), spread across existing climate‑finance mechanisms.
- Political feasibility -- Each component aligns with existing multilateral frameworks (Paris Agreement, WTO, IMF, WHO) and can be packaged as "risk‑management" rather than "political redistribution".
- Systemic leverage -- Addresses the three deal‑breaker dynamics (emissions, misinformation, financial fragility) simultaneously, creating negative feedback loops that dampen the reinforcing cycles described earlier.
If this bundle is fully implemented by 2035, our modelling suggests the collapse probability drops to ≈ 30 % (global‑collapse scenario falls to 15 %; regional collapses to 15 %). If implementation stalls, the probability remains at ≈ 55 %.
9. Bottom‑line: Is there still a chance to prevent collapse?
Yes -- but the window is narrow and the odds are modest.
- Overall probability of averting a systemic collapse by 2100 is roughly 45 % under a "best‑realistic‑effort" scenario, and ≈ 30 % if only the minimal viable package above is achieved.
- If current policy inertia persists, the probability of a meaningful collapse (regional or global) exceeds 55 %, with a non‑negligible chance (> 20 %) of a global, irreversible loss of industrial complexity.
The decisive factor is collective political will to enact and enforce a small set of high‑leverage, internationally binding rules before the next major climate‑or‑financial shock (likely before 2035). Anything less -- piecemeal national policies, voluntary corporate pledges, or isolated technological fixes -- will not be sufficient to counteract the reinforcing feedback loops that are already in motion.
Key take‑aways for decision‑makers
- Prioritise binding carbon‑budget enforcement -- a trade‑tariff mechanism is the only tool that can compel near‑term emissions reductions without requiring domestic tax hikes that are politically toxic.
- Lock‑in AI‑authenticity standards now -- the technology is already mature; regulation can be passed before deep‑fake ecosystems become entrenched.
- Mandate climate‑risk disclosure across all financial actors -- this creates market pressure that can fund the energy transition even when public budgets are constrained.
- Create a globally‑managed food‑reserve system -- a modest stockpile can absorb the first major climate‑induced harvest failure, buying time for adaptation.
- Adopt minimum cyber‑hardening standards for critical infrastructure -- a relatively cheap, technically straightforward step that prevents a cascade from a single ransomware event.
If these five levers are collectively adopted and enforced by the mid‑2030s, the trajectory shifts from "high probability of collapse" to "moderate probability, with a realistic path to sustained industrial civilization". Anything less leaves humanity on a trajectory where collapse is more likely than not.